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Abstract
We investigate how the inﬂuence of the military diﬀers across authoritarian
regimes and verify whether there are actually systematic diﬀerences in military
expenditures amongst diﬀerent forms of dictatorships. We argue that public
choices in autocracies result from a struggle for power between the leader and
the elite. Elites matter because they control the fates of dictators, since most
dictators are overthrown by members of their inner circle. Both actors want to
ensure their continued political inﬂuence through a favorable allocation of the
government budget. Moreover, the control over the security forces gives access
to troops and weaponry, and aﬀects the ease with which elites can unseat dic-
tators. Autocratic rulers employ diﬀerent bundles of co-option and repression
for staying in power, and thus diﬀer in the extent that they are required to buy
oﬀ the military. Therefore, the institutional makeup of dictatorships aﬀects
the nature of leader-elite interaction, and in turn the share of the government
budget allocated to military spending. Drawing on a new data set that sorts
dictatorships into 5 categories from 1960 to 2000, our empirical results suggest
that while military and personalist regimes have respectively the highest and
lowest level of military spending among authoritarian regimes, monarchies and
single-party regimes display intermediate patterns of spending.
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1 Introduction
Although one third of the world's countries are ruled by authoritarian regimes, the degree
of variance in the behavior of heterogeneous dictatorships has never been considered in
the large literature on the determinants of military spending (e.g. Goldsmith, 2003; Dunne
et al., 2008, 2009). Even though this literature includes the eﬀect of regime type, this is
generally identiﬁed by indices that rank countries on some scale from perfect democracy
to absolute autocracy (e.g. Polity IV), thus ignoring the substantial diﬀerences between
various forms of democracy and autocracy. More importantly, there are no empirical
accounts of the large institutional diﬀerences between various forms of authoritarian rules
on patterns of defense expenditure.
In any form of democracy, civil-military relations are relatively straightforward, char-
acterized by what Huntington (1995) deﬁnes as "objective civilian control", even though
this control my be still subject to the threat of a military coup. In contrast, civil-military
relations in autocracies vary substantially according to the type of authoritarian regime.
These relations are crucial, since they are shown to aﬀect military eﬀectiveness (Pilster &
Bohmelt, 2011) and may be expected to impact on the size of the military. By unpacking
the authoritarian regime category, we argue that these regimes diﬀer in their capacity
to repress the political mobilization through the army and to co-opt the elite, and that
they accordingly exhibit predictable diﬀerences in the extent to which members of the
elite coalition have control over the armed and security forces. Indeed, the majority of
coups are executed by members of the military forces (Kebschull, 1994) and the less direct
control that leaders have over such forces, the more his position is at risk. Admittedly,
diﬀerent regimes may require diﬀerent strategies to buy-oﬀ the military. And the military
budget is not the only measure of military inﬂuence in a authoritarian regime. However,
military spending is the only measure that is easily comparable across time and across
countries. Therefore, our primary scope is to explore how large is the military apparatus
(and possibly his inﬂuence) in diﬀerent forms of dictatorships.
There are several way of categorizing autocratic regimes, because autocracies come
in many forms. We explore military expenditure in personalist regimes, single-party,
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military regimes and monarchies. These categories are based on whether access to power
is dominated by a single individual, a hegemonic party, the military or through practices of
hereditary succession. Yet, dictatorships are often characterized by a level of institutional
"`ﬂuidity"' (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011), as a result of the power struggle between diﬀerent
actors in the system. In fact, it is common to observe various forms of dictatorships
creating or co-opting a political party to support the regime and prolong their hold on
power, such as the personalist reign in the Dominican Republic in 1966 or the Brazilian
military junta in 1964 (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011).1 Since some of the authoritarian regimes
exhibit characteristics from more than one system - or they just do not fall neatly in one
category - we acknowledge (and control for) the existence of a number of intermediate
categories, or hybrid regimes. These categories are in fact excluded from the empirical
analysis, as it will be explained in the empirical section.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on defense and gov-
ernment spending and its relation with regime type. Section 3 bring insights from the
literature on institutional variation among autocratic regimes to conceptualize the logic
of political survival in autocratic regimes and to generate testable prediction on autocra-
cies' impact on military spending. Section 4 describes our dataset, Section 5 presents the
methods used in the empirical analysis and discusses the empirical evidence and Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Regime type and defense spending
The primary logic behind analyzing the nature of the dictatorship is crucial: diﬀerent
types of dictator make diﬀerent policy decisions. We believe that this is an important
question since the performance of a regime in terms of public choices helps to explain
the regime's eﬀect on social and economic changes. We focus on a particular share of
the government budget: military spending. Political scientists have long argued that
governments can use military spending to keep their militaries from overthrowing them
(Nordlinger, 1977). Military spending aﬀects the incentives to stage a coup by increasing
1However, as Frantz & Ezrow (2011) notes, this incorporation sometimes do not alter the regime's
power base
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the value received by the military when it refrains from staging a coup, thus reducing
the expected relative value of staging one (Leon, 2010). Thus, militaries extort their
governments (Collier & Hoeer, 2006).2 Therefore, identifying whether the military is
a key actor in a dictatorship - and thus the extent these regimes are vulnerable- is very
important. Yet, military spending has several additional important implications: it re-
duces the resources available for social welfare (Sprout & Sprout, 1968) and crowds out
consumption opportunities for the public (Garﬁnkel, 1994); empirically, it has a clear
negative eﬀect on investment in OECD countries (Smith, 1980); and a negative eﬀect on
growth in less developed countries (Deger & Smith, 1983), thus retarding their develop-
ment. More recently, Knight et al. (1996) point out to the negative eﬀects of military
spending on resources available for investments and a distortion in relative prices while
Aizenman & Glick (2006) show that military spending reduces growth in countries facing
low levels of threat. Thus, reducing the military burden can foster, in some countries,
the economic growth. Therefore, a understanding how regime types aﬀect the size of the
military budget is of utmost importance.
A review of the literature on the complex nexus between government spending and
regime types is beyond the scope of this paper. We thus focus on scholarship that has
examined how and why military spending diﬀer in democracies and autocracies. Over-
all, general agreement exists that autocracies devote more of their economic resources
to military spending than do democratic systems (e.g. Hewitt, 1992; Goldsmith, 2003).
However, theoretical explanations for these empirical ﬁndings tend to vary. Democratic
rulers seeking re-election have more incentives to increase social spending - and reduce
military budgets- than dictators. Evidence from Latin America also suggest that a tran-
sition from authoritarian to democratic regimes is accompanied by a reduction in military
spending (Russett & Oneal, 2001).
When war enters the equation, the relation is everything but clear-cut. While Ford-
ham & Walker (2005) ﬁnds that reduced military budgets may help democratic regimes
to avoid the risk of war, a number of scholars conclude that democracies devote more
resources to the military during war than do autocracies, for a number of reasons: i)
2Collier & Hoeer (2006) ﬁnd a non-monotonic relation between coup risk and military spending
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democracies are relative wealthier, thus outspend autocracies (Lake, 1992); ii) due to a
greater transparency, liberal democracies have ﬁnancial advantages on the international
market, allowing them to raise massive funds through debt, thus ﬁnancing larger and
longer war (Schultz & Weingast, 2003); and iii) democratic leaders seeking re-election
have more incentives to win interstates wars than dictators do (De Mesquita et al., 2004).
However, the empirical literature presents also many exceptions, in which the relation
between states' system of government and defense spending is completely absent (e.g.
Eﬁrd et al., 2003; Reiter & Stam, 2003).
As the literature points out, the impact of diﬀerent regime type on the defense budget
is neither theoretically convincing nor empirically veriﬁed. A recent work by Bel & Elias-
Moreno (2009) explores the eﬀects of government form, electoral rules, concentration of
parliamentary parties, and ideology on military expenditure. But no attention is paid
to the interaction between civil wars and military expenditure under dictatorships. And
none of the above accounts explain patterns of defense spending under diﬀerent forms
of dictatorship. For example, given everything equal, which type of dictatorship is more
likely to increase the military budget? The theoretical mechanism that we propose is
based on two key actors, the leadership and the elite, and their respective control over
the armed forces.
3 Comparative autocracy
The relationship between autocracies and military spending is not so-clear cut. Besides
seeking to increase his personal consumption and establishing power over his subjects, a
dictator needs to remain in oﬃce, which is the most obvious and the most diﬃcult goal
to achieve (Tullock, 2003). If the ruler wishes to continue to exercise power, and enjoy
the support of the armed forces, he must thwart the eﬀort of the generals to replace
him; at the same time he has to prevent the risk of a civilian insurgency. To obtain
these objectives, he relies on two instruments - loyalty and repression (Wintrobe, 2000).
Loyalty is won by making the generals better oﬀ. To repress certain actions or plots by
the elite, he must also invest resources on the army, police, jails and informers. Yet,
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while the above discussion can be easily generalized to any form of dictatorship, we need
a theoretical framework to highlight systematic diﬀerences in the weight of the military
apparatus across diﬀerent autocracies. This paper is a step in dissecting autocracies in
the context of their impact on military expenditure. Therefore, our theoretical framework
must be seen as a ﬁrst attempt to ascribe a peculiar "`inclination"' for the size of the
military to diﬀerent types of autocracy.
We develop four hypotheses that explain military spending in authoritarian regimes
as a function of the diﬀerent combinations of loyalty-building and repression that leaders
use to maintain power and co-opt or repress the elite. Elites play a key role in author-
itarian politics. While in democracies political leaders need the support of part of the
citizenship to stay in power, in dictatorships the set of individuals required to maintain
the power is the elite. Elites are crucial because they control the fates of dictators, since
most dictators are overthrown by members of their inner circle rather than by popular
uprising - e.g. Argentina 1981, Nigeria 1975, Thailand 1977, Ghana 1978 (see Frantz
& Ezrow, 2011). Svolik (2009) examines all 316 authoritarian leaders who lost power
by nonconstitutional means between 1945 and 2002. Among 303 leaders, only 32 were
removed by a popular uprising and another 30 stepped down under public pressure to
democratize. The remaining 205 dictators, more than two-thirds, were removed by gov-
ernment insiders, either government members or members of the military or the security
forces.3 An overwhelming majority of authoritarian leaders lose power as a result of a
successful coup rather than a popular uprising. Dictators are in permanent risk of being
deposed through conspiracies that most of the time would come from oﬃcials of high
rank (Tullock, 2003). Indeed, several scholars point out to the struggle for power within
the dictator's ruling circle, the main risk of leadership turnover (Svolik, 2009; Gallego &
Pitchik, 2004; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). The elite represents the small segment of the
population that brought the leader into oﬃce, and that, in principal, can depose him.
Maintaining the support of the elite is essential to prevent armed coups. De Mesquita
et al. (2005) refers to this subset of society controlling the access to political power as
3Twenty more leaders lost power by an assassination that was not part of a coup or a popular uprising,
whereas 16 were removed by foreign intervention.
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the "`selectorate"' while Haber (2006) uses the expression "`launching organizations"'.
In our study, the elites are represented by the royal family (monarchy), the oﬃcer corps
(military regime), high level oﬃcers in the party (single party) or a narrow network of
people tied to the survival of the individual ruler (personalist).
This is not to say that the vertical accountability, the responsiveness of the dictator
to the broader mass of citizens, play no role. Even though the citizens do not participate
in the selection of the ruler, they can determine the prospect of his survival by mounting
an insurgency and threatening the regime. Thus, the ruler needs to spend resources on
social welfare to ensure citizens' approval and on the military to repress a possible civilian
insurgency. We will take into account this dynamic. However, to understand authoritarian
politics, and public choices, we need to examine primarily the politics among the governing
authoritarian elites.
Hypothesis 1: Military regimes have higher levels of military spending than
other types of authoritarian regimes.
In military regimes a group of oﬃcers controls the access to political oﬃce, deciding
who rules, and exercises inﬂuence on policy (Geddes, 2003). According to the recent
literature on civil wars and institutions, military regimes run the highest risk of civil
conﬂict (see for example Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Fjelde, 2010). This is because the elite
- i.e. the oﬃcer corps in the armed forces 4- has full control over the security forces,
putting the leader's position at risk. If the above literature is correct, and since military
expenditure is associated with positive incentives to stage a coup (Leon, 2010), we should
expect higher level of military spending than in other forms of autocracies, all else equal.
Yet, there are other important dynamics aﬀecting this high level of military burden.
Even though civilians may hold political positions, the power rests with the military elite
(Bienen, 1978). The elite is in an excellent position for gaining support, both active and
passive, from the required quotient of the armed forces (p.335 O'Kane, 1989). Moreover,
military regimes stand apart from other types of authoritarian regimes because military
elites may not necessarily want to maximize their stay in power (Wright, 2008). Rather,
4As Frantz & Ezrow (2011) correctly points out, in these regimes it is impossible to obtain elite status
without current membership in the military
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the military's corporate interests typically entail securing ample military budgets; keeping
civilian leaders from interfering in their internal aﬀairs (e.g.through appointments); and
guaranteeing immunity from human rights prosecutions (see Finer, 1975; Nordlinger, 1977;
Geddes, 1999). Geddes (2003) models these regimes with a coordination game, where the
main challenge is to solve coordination problems among oﬃcers who want to return to
the barracks when political diﬃculties beset the regime, and those preferring to hold onto
power. Oﬃcers may be more concerned about professional unity, which means that a
military dictator would rather go back to barracks than risk damaging the institutional
integrity of the armed forces. Therefore, we should also observe that the leader protects
the corporate interests of these military commanders through heavy allocations of the
government budget to the armed forces.
Moreover, unlike other types of regimes, military regimes may not even be averse to
democratization if they can guarantee their corporate interests (Wright, 2008). If this is
true, then the existence of a large defense budget decreases the costs of democratizing for
the military, thus making them more likely to democratize, all else equal. Historically,
many militaries made bargains with civilian elites which lead to democratization (Karl,
1990; Colomer, 2000).5 Country-analyses suggest that the military also bargained with
political party elites over military prerogatives in El Salvador (1982), Guatemala (1985)
and Honduras (1982) (Ruhl, 1996; Williams & Walter, 1997; Schirmer, 1998).
Military regimes enjoy also high approvals among the privileged because they protect
they properties and among the middle class because they are seen as a solution to political
violence and instability (O'Donnell et al., 1973). In fact, military governments place
an high value on internal order (Stepan, 1971) and they usually have a comparative
advantage in coercion (Davenport, 2007). Finally, since military dictators lack institutions
for eﬃcient co-option, such as a political party, have few alternatives but to repress the
opposition through military means, thus increasing the military burden. For all these
reasons, we should expect that the elite in military regimes have larger budget allocations
among authoritarian regimes.
5Karl (1990) lists Colombia (1958), Chile (1998), Uruguay (1984), and Venezuela (1958), as arranged
transitions to democracy.
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Hypothesis 2: Monarchies have a lower level of military spending than mil-
itary regimes
The leader in monarchic regimes is usually a king or emir and he coordinates his
rule through the royal family, which represents the elite or his inner circle. Monarchies
lack the advantage of a mass-based political party to co-opt, and therefore are unable
to support long-lasting and self-enforcing agreement to support their rule (Magaloni,
2008). However, they can acquire traditional legitimacy due to history and continuity,
and thus become strongly institutionalized. In Morocco, for example, the institutions
are based on a constitutional monarchy which claims legitimacy through its genealogical
descendant from the Prophet Muhammad. Traditional legitimacy may lead the military
to establish pledge of allegiance to the monarchy, as in Thailand in 1957 or in Nepal
before 1996. Moreover, monarchies are still able to make agreements and oﬀer long-run
private beneﬁts in exchange for political support. This is because the the constitutional
practice of hereditary succession mitigate the issue of succession which is claimed to be
the cause of instability in many dictatorships (Olson, 2000).
In this respect, the royal family serves as a built-in network to organize the rule of
the regime and manage succession.6 Like a dominant-party organization, the royal family
has a vested interest in the survival of the regime beyond the survival of the current
ruler. Moreover the monarch must confer resources to the royal family through rents and
ministerial positions, including key positions in the armed forces, and the family acts as
a source of constraints on the decision-making processes (Gandhi, 2008).
In this sense, we believe that the military is subordinated to the royal family but
has incentives to support it because an investment in the ruling coalition is likely to
generate pay-oﬀs in the long-run. Since the succession is institutionalized, the future value
deriving from being loyal to the royal family is more secure. Loyalty translated in beneﬁts:
the armed services are given high proportions of national budgets, thus detracting from
development and social spending, in order to ensure the military's loyalty. Expensive
weapons are often purchased according to military commanders' preference rather than
6Some dictatorships, which are not classically deﬁned as monarchies, may also develop a sort of
hereditarian succession, where the new leader is chosen within the "`family dynasty"', such as the North
Korea, but this is rare and would be usually classiﬁed as hybrid systems in the existing dataset.
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on the nation's need for these speciﬁc arms or the armed forces' ability to maintain them
(Rubin, 2000). The demand for high-technology weapons is important for the king's egos,
national prestige, and the deterrence of external threats, yet these expensive purchases
are often responses to the desires or decisions of military commanders (Rubin, 1980).
Generals interfere in the budget process to ensure their demands are met. Moreover, the
royal family keeps oﬃcers loyal by high pay and special privileges, such as special housing
(Rubin, 1980). Clearly, such privileges inﬂate the military budgets.
Moreover, most of the monarchies are located in the Middle-East, and these oil-rich
economies have resources to adopt policies of rent-distribution among the population,
thus co-opting actors beyond the military apparatus to prevent take-overs. These rev-
enue streams generated by natural resources can be used to alleviate the vertical pressure
against the regime by funding repression through the military and broad distributive
spending (Ross, 2001).7 Monarchies, shares more institutional features with military
regimes than with single-party regimes. They share the same political insulation enjoyed
by military governments, and even though they are endowed with some forms of reli-
gious or historical authority, they still rule without institutions (Fjelde, 2010). The main
diﬀerence with military regimes is the lack of coercive expertise that makes them more
reluctant to enforce overt repressive strategies.
Hypothesis 3: Single party regimes have a lower level of military spending
than military regimes and monarchies
The most important feature of single party regimes is their extensive patronage net-
works, which help to mobilize votes and supporters. Over 85% of single party regimes
have legislatures (Wright, 2008), and their mass-based party organization can reach large
segments of the population and penetrate the civil society at all levels. While monarchies
may exert just as much centralized power over the elite and citizens as military regimes,
the contention here is that single party regimes have a large distributional networks and a
mass support, which translate into more eﬀective vote mobilization and support. Single-
party governments possess some of the characteristics of democracies that reduce the use
7These are countries where the military overspending was one factor contributing to the regime's fall,
such as the Shah's regime (Rubin, 1980)
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of the military in state repression, incorporating a greater proportion of the population
into the political process (Davenport, 2007). The party organization is a strong and inﬂu-
encing institutional infrastructure to monitor all groups in the society and demand from
competing groups of power (like the military) can be discussed without challenging the
foundations of the regime (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006).
A massive party apparatus allows the dictator to selectively target threatening or rival
groups, and in doing so single-party regimes can eﬀectively subordinate the military to
political control (Peceny et al., 2002). Indeed, in this regime the military is completely
subordinated to the party and often party functionaries are embedded in the armed forces
to ensure their loyalty (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011). Soldiers are duly indoctrinated in party
ideology and promoted according to their loyalty to the political system. This form of
massive and persuasive party propaganda within the military has been long witnessed in
China under Mao (Whitson, 1969) and more recently under the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) (Koh, 2000). Even more importantly, single-party regimes have large non-military
intelligence organizations which ensure a wide and pervasive control of the society (Lai
& Slater, 2006). The interference of the party at all levels of the military structure make
it diﬃcult for the armed forces to challenge the regime, while the single-party apparatus
can easily suppress the opposition within the state apparatus itself (Slater, 2003). Power
positions and government rents are predominately allocated to high oﬃcials within the
party. The party is also a vehicle to advance the career in the government through
a stable system of patronage (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). Thus, prospects of career
advancement in the armed forces is dependent on the willingness of military oﬃcers
to identify themselves with the party. Oﬀers of selective beneﬁts to reward support,
combined with the credible threat that these privileges depend on individuals loyalty,
serve as a strong deterrent against challenges and defections (Wintrobe, 2000).
In addition, Peceny & Butler (2004)'s suggest that single-party regimes, such as
Malaysia (1957 - 1994) and Botswana (1966 - 1994), are signiﬁcantly less likely to initiate
disputes against many of the other types of authoritarian regimes and less likely to be tar-
geted by other types of authoritarian regimes. This is because they have an institutional
set-up that makes them resilient to challenges to their authority; political parties allow
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the dictator to forcefully control and buy oﬀ the opponents (Fjelde, 2010). Given the
subordination of the armed forces to the mass-based party, and since military spending
is usually associated with ongoing conﬂicts or state repression, we should expect a lower
level of military expenditure in single-party regimes when compared to monarchies and
military regimes.
Hypothesis 4: Personalist regimes have the lowest level of military spending
among authoritarian regimes.
A good deﬁnition of personalist regimes from which to proceed is provided by Geddes
(2003): the institutional feature that distinguishes personalist regimes from others is that
although personalist regimes have parties and militaries, these organizations have not
become suﬃciently developed or autonomous to prevent the leader from taking personal
control of policy decisions and selection of regime personnel. In fact, the personalization
is the concentration of decision-making and coercive power in the hands of one person,
unfettered by a party central committee or institutionalized military decision-making
process (Geddes, 2004, p.13). While in other types of authoritarian regimes the dictators
build support through the provision of targeted public goods (single party regimes) or
govern by repression (military regimes), in personalist regimes he exchanges some material
rewards, private goods, to a narrow group of regime insiders in return for mobilizing
political support (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994). Moreover, he has full control over
the selection of the inner circle without the constraints of party or military guidelines
(Frantz & Ezrow, 2011). As a consequence, the elite often comprises associates, friends
and family members, such as in the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos or the Dominican
Republic under Rafael Trujillo. Personalist dictators may also create paramilitary forces
to counterbalance any threat from within the armed forces, as did Duvalier in Haiti for
example (Ferguson, 1988).
Personalist dictators are even likely to initiate a war with democracies because they
are institutionally unconstrained and therefore unlikely to lose power in case of an unsuc-
cessful war (Reiter & Stam, 2003).8 Generally, all dictators seek a form of personalization
8Their list of personalist dictatorships ﬁghting wars includes the following: North Korea, Korean
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of their power, but the extent they maximize their power depends on the organizational
strength of the launching organizations (Haber, 2006). Here we argue that because elite
institutions, particularly the military, are typically weak and dependent on the dictator
in personalistic regimes, they are less likely to inﬂuence the distribution of power and
the allocation of the government rent. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that elites
in personalist dictatorships have the greatest diﬃculty ousting dictators, and therefore
personalistic dictators face the lowest risk of being overthrown in any given year (Frantz
& Ezrow, 2011). In Chad, for example, eﬀort to topple Idriss Deby failed due to lack
of elite unity. Lukashenko in Belarus and Antonio Salazar in Portugal represent similar
situations (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011). Moreover, personalist dictators ensure that no indi-
viduals become too powerful through frequent rotations, and often purges, to maintain a
situation of uncertainty and vulnerability. Examples are abundant, such as in Iraq under
Saddham Hussein, the Central African Republic under Jean-Bédel Bokassa or in Zaire
under Mobutu (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011). These regimes are characterized by the narrowest
network of elites, whose destiny is tied to the survival of the individual ruler. Indeed, per-
sonalist regimes are more likely to collapse following the removal of the dictator than in
single-party or military regimes (Geddes, 2003). Exclusion from the ruling coalition cuts
the elite's access to the distribution of resources while in case of a regime collapse the elite
ends up out of power. Finally, the level of accountability is so low that the dictator can
spend fewer resources to maintain his power. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to ascribe particular
economic policies to the category of personalist rulers. Since power rests in the hands
of the dictator, policies are subject to his personal preferences to a greater extent than
in other regime types.9 Elites in personalist dictatorships do not belong to a unifying
institution, and the military has a low bargaining power relative to this elite. Therefore,
personalist rulers have weaker incentives to disperse resources in the military apparatus.
Table 1 provides a summary of our theoretical framework and helps to associate to each
War; Egypt, 1956 Suez War; Pakistan, 1965 Second Kashmir War; Egypt, Six Day War; Syria, Six Day
War; Egypt, 1969 War of Attrition; Pakistan, 1971 Bangladesh War; Iraq, Yom Kippur War; Egypt,
Yom Kippur War; Syria, 1973 Yom Kippur War; Cambodia, 1975 Vietnam-Cambodian War; Uganda,
Tanzania-Uganda War; Libya, Tanzania-Uganda War; Iraq, Iraq-Iran War; Syria, 1982 Lebanon War;
and Iraq, Gulf War.
9Brooker (2000) illustrates these diﬀerences by comparing the socialist preferences of Nyerre of Tan-
zania to the adoption of neoclassical economic policies by Pinochet of Chile.
The Demand for Military Expenditure in Authoritarian Regimes 14
regime a relative level of military spending.
4 Data
4.1 Military expenditure
The arguably best data on military expenditures is supplied by SIPRI. Unfortunately,
SIPRI does not provide data before 1988. However, years before then are interesting
for this research, as they yield so many more examples of dictatorships. The COW
National Material Capabilities database supplies data on military expenditures from 1960
onwards. Unfortunately, these data are not of the best quality because they are compiled
from diﬀerent sources without precise attention to the compatibility of these sources,
which may have varying deﬁnitions of military expenditures (e.g. they include/exclude
paramilitary spending, pensions, spending on R&D, etc). We use COW data from 1960
to 1987 and SIPRI data from 1988 to 2000. COW data are in current USD. We transform
them into constant USD using the US CPI with 2005 as the base year. SIPRI data are in
constant 2008 USD. We transform all data into percentages of GDP using GDP ﬁgures
(in constant 2000 USD) from the World Bank - World Development Indicators - to get a
measure of military burden.
Combining diﬀerent sources is problematic. To get a picture of the compatibility of
SIPRI and COW data, we examine their ratio in 1988 and subsequent years in which a
reasonable amount of overlapping data is available. Table 3 summarizes this information.
The mean ratio is close to one. One would not expect a ratio exactly equal to one
because of SIPRI and COW use diﬀerent base years. Furthermore, from the histogram
(Figure 1) we can see that the distribution of the SIPRI/COW ratio in 1988 is aﬀected
by outliers. A closer examination of these outliers gives interesting insights into the
compatibility of the two sources. For example, Brazil, Columbia, Lebanon, Poland and
Turkey all have SIPRI/COW ratios greater than 3 in 1988. However, in subsequent years,
these ratios decrease and roughly converge to one. We suspect that this is because after
1988 data collection improves, and data generally become more accessible, thus reducing
discrepancies between sources that are the result of inaccuracies. Furthermore, after 1988
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COW actually collects data from, amongst others, SIPRI itself, so there is a direct overlap
in some instances.
However, a major inconsistency between SIPRI and COW data becomes obvious when
examining the minimum value, which is 0. This is an unusual number to arrive at when
taking ratios. This ﬁgure corresponds to Costa Rica, which SIPRI sites as having zero
military expenditure, while COW estimates Costa Rica's military expenditure as being
in the ten thousand range. This divergence may be the result of varying deﬁnitions which
include/exclude paramilitary spending, pensions, spending on R&D, etc. To account for
such discrepancies, we include a dummy which equals 1 when the source is SIPRI and
zero when the source is COW to capture the eﬀect of using the diﬀerent sources. This
dummy must be interpreted carefully. In addition to picking up diﬀerences in the sources,
it will pick up a "Cold War eﬀect" because the SIPRI data corresponds with the post
Cold War era.
More generally, it must be noted that data on military spending are notoriously inac-
curate. There are three major problems: reliability, comparability, and validity. Problems
with the reliability of data occur because oﬃcial sources do not always disclose informa-
tion accurately. By its very nature, military expenditure is an item that governments
may prefer to conceal. In many countries the oﬃcial data only cover a part of total mil-
itary expenditure. Important items can be hidden under non-military budget headings
or can even be ﬁnanced entirely outside the government budget. Furthermore, compar-
isons between the data of diﬀerent countries are complicated by the fact that countries
have varying deﬁnitions of what comprises military spending, and these deﬁnitions may
even vary over time. Finally, the problem of validity arises because military expenditure
does not necessarily reﬂect military strength or capability. While military expenditure
undoubtedly impacts on military capability, other factors, such as the balance between
personnel and equipment, the technological level of military equipment, and the state of
maintenance and repair play an important role too (Stålenheim et al., 2008). Given all
the above considerations, our results must be interpreted with caution.
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4.2 Regime types
Many studies of countries' political institutions and their eﬀect on wars or public choices
make use of the Polity IV dataset, for example, studies on the relationship between
democracy and civil wars (e.g. Fearon & Laitin, 2003) or works on electoral rules and
military spending (Bel & Elias-Moreno, 2009). However, using a single scale may not
be appropriate when diﬀerences between regimes are not measurable by their degree of
democratization. These data must be used critically, principally because "`vastly diﬀerent
temporal, spatial, and social contexts support the same autocracy scale values"' (Gled-
itsch & Ward, 1997, p.380). Put diﬀerently, autocracies with the same scale score are not
equivalent and may have very diﬀerent institutional architectures. Notwithstanding this
problem, there are only few disaggregated analysis of authoritarian regimes, in relation to
their attitude towards civil wars (Fjelde, 2010) and state repression (Davenport, 2007).
To the best of our knowledge, there exist three alternative datasets which dissect au-
tocracies into diﬀerent categories. The ﬁrst, constructed by Gandhi & Przeworski (2006),
distinguishes among autocratic regimes according to the dictator's personal characteristics
- i.e. whether he is a civilian or a member of the military. This method is straightforward
and does not require the researcher to make any subjective judgment calls. However,
it tells us nothing about the institutional framework that underpins the regime. Dicta-
tors classiﬁed univocally as civilian may have very diﬀerent selectorates keeping them in
power. To fulﬁll the purpose of our paper, we require a dataset that captures diﬀerences
among launching organizations.
The second dataset was put together by Hadenius & Teorell (2007). However, they
do not identify personalist regimes, and therefore do not distinguish between regimes
where rulers represent the professionalized military institution and regimes where the
dictator retains a military rank as well as some military prerogatives but has dissolved
the military council. Our fourth hypothesis speaks directly to the importance of diﬀerent
forms and degrees of personalization in shaping the public policies, including the allocation
of resources and power to the military.
For the above reasons, we use the third dataset provided by Frantz & Ezrow (2011),
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who update Geddes (1999)'s dataset with the information on monarchies. They sort
dictatorships into single party states, military regimes, personal rule, monarchies and
four mixed regime types. However, their dataset only contains observations on dictator-
ships, while non-autocratic countries are missing. Countries which have transitioned to
democracy or are experiencing a spell of democracy between years of dictatorship are not
observed in those particular years. In the majority of cases these missing observations
correspond to positive values in the Polity IV dataset.10 Thus, we allow Frantz & Ezrow
(2011)'s dummies to equal 0 when Polity is greater than or equal to 1. As a result the
dataset covers a panel of democracies and varied dictatorships.
Figure 2 shows the number of countries that fall into each regime type by year. Single
party states are the most prevalent form of autocracy through the whole period, fol-
lowed by the other pure form autocracies - personal dictatorships, military regimes and
monarchies, respectively. There are fewer cases of mixed regime types than pure form
autocracies. It is also noteworthy that military regimes are amongst the most frequent
regime type throughout the 1970's, but begin to disappear in the 80s and are among the
least frequent regime type in 2000. Thus, a pre-1990s sample has a diﬀerent balance of
regime types than a post-1990s sample.
In addition to the frequency and percentage of total observation, Table 2 summarizes
the mean military expenditure and the mean Polity IV score for each regime type. These
summary statistics do not reveal all that much about the relationship between military
expenditures and regime type. Although it appears that regimes facing a triple threat
(from a personalist dictator, the military and a single party) have the highest average
military expenditure, there is also substantial variation within this category, as indicated
by the large standard deviation. The same applies to the ﬁrst and second runners up,
monarchies and single party states, respectively.
But there are a number of examples in which countries are coded as dictatorships by
Frantz & Ezrow (2011), but score positively in Polity IV. For example, Malaysia in coded
as a single party state, while scoring around 4 in Polity IV throughout the entire period.
10For example, Argentina is coded as a military regime from 1966-73; unobserved in 1974 and 1975;
military regime from 1976-83; and unobserved after 1984. In 1974 and 1975, Argentina scored 6, compared
with -9 in 1966-73; from 1984 onwards, it scores 8, compared with -9 in 1987-83.
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This highlights the diﬃculties involved in categorizing countries. Including Polity IV as
a covariate allows the data to decide which variable has the stronger eﬀect.
The Polity Score (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) measures the level of democracy in a
country and is a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10
(consolidated democracy). It consists of six component measures that record key qualities
of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. As
we said, this is measuring something diﬀerent from the regime type dummies. Diﬀerences
between regimes are separate from their degree of democratization: diﬀerent regime types
can have the same Polity score. (For example, Albania, single party state, Brazil - a
military regime, and Jordan, a monarchy, all score -9 in certain years.) We include Polity
IV because it has been shown to be an important determinant of military spending (see
introduction), not as a measure of regime type.
4.3 Other data
Dummy variables on wars - internal and external - are from the Correlates of War Project.
COW deﬁnes war as sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a
minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths (Sarkees, 2011). Intra-state (civil) wars refer to
those that predominantly take place within the recognized territory of a state. Inter-state
wars refer to thoise that take place between states.
Finally, we collected data on GDP (in 2000 constant US Dollars) and total population
from the World Bank World Development Indicators; and data on openness, deﬁned as
exports plus imports divided by GDP (in 2005 constant US Dollars) from the Penn World
Table. Table 4 outlines the summary statistics for these variables.
5 Econometric model and empirical results
Following the standard literature on the determinants of military expenditures (see for
example Dunne et al., 2008, 2009), a ﬁxed eﬀects model is speciﬁed as:
yit = x
′
itβ + fi + it i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ...T (1)
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where yit is the log of military burden; x is a vector of strictly exogenous observed
explanatory variables and β is the associated coeﬃcient vector; fi is the time invariant
country-speciﬁc eﬀects and it is the error term. The covariates vector x includes infor-
mation on regime type, Polity IV , intra-state war, inter-state war, (log) GDP per capita,
(log) population and (log) openness. GDP per capita is a measure of wealth, while pop-
ulation is a measure of size. Openness is a proxy for economic integration. The rationale
behind the inclusion of this variable is that the more open a country is, the more peaceful
will be its relationships with other countries, and therefore the less need it has for defense
spending. However, the opposite has been argued for developing countries: the level of
economic integration may, in fact, be the source of discontent, as dependence on the world
market render their economies more vulnerable to ﬂuctuations in world prices. In addi-
tion, the beneﬁts of trade only accrue to certain groups (i.e. the elites). In anticipation of
resulting internal dissent developing countries may become more militarized (Rosh, 1988).
Internal and external war pick up immediate threats. A country engaged in war will not
only give greater priority to military spending as a matter of urgency, but will also need
to restock arms and ammunition used in ﬁghting. We do not include political factors,
such as alliance memberships and political processes, as done, for example, by Palmer
(1990), but rather focus on economic and strategic factors, according to the mainstream
economic literature on the topic, even though we recognize the importance of competing
determinants of military spending.
We transform population, GDP per capita and trade into logs to scale down the
variance and reduce the eﬀect of outliers. We control for group-wise heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation - the presence of which is conﬁrmed by the appropriate diagnostic
tests - by reporting robust standard errors.
We restrict regime type to include only the pure-form autocracies, i.e. personalist
dictatorships, one-party states, monarchies and military regimes. The frequency of hybrid
regime type is low, and the relationship between the leader and the military in mixed
regime types is too case-speciﬁc to make reasonable predictions about it.
In addition, we examine whether the determinants of military expenditure behave
diﬀerently in autocracies as compared to democracies. To this purpose we ﬁrst estimate
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the model on the subsample of autocracies, which are deﬁned by a negative polity score.
Second, we estimate this model (excluding regime type) on the subsample of democracies,
loosely deﬁned by a positive polity score. Next, we test for structural diﬀerences in the
explanatory variables across the two subgroups using a Chow test. Finally, we estimate
the ﬁxed eﬀects model on the full sample of autocracies and democracies, allowing for
structural diﬀerences between the two subsamples where necessary.
The ﬁrst column in Table 5 summarizes the results for pure-form autocracies. Military
regimes do, in fact, spend the most on the military, closely followed by monarchies, and
these results are both signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient on single-party states is
quite a bit smaller than that on monarchies, but is insigniﬁcant. The positive sign on all
three dummies implies that personalist regimes spend the least on the military. While
the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients on military regimes and monarchies is statistically neg-
ligble, the diﬀerence between each of these regimes and single-party states is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level . These results are in keeping with our prediction. In particular
they suggest that the four regime types can be grouped into those with higher predicted
military spending, i.e. military regimes and monarchies, and relatively lower miltiary
spending, i.e. one party states and personalist regimes. Our theory suggests that this
is explained by the fact that one-party states and personalist dictators have alternative
ways of checking the military and need not buy the support of the military to the extent
that military regimes and monarchies do.
As expected, Polity IV has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on military expenditures: the
more democratic/the less autocratic a regime is overall, the less it spends on the military.
Intra-state war and inter-state war have a positive eﬀect on the military burden, even
though the former is insigniﬁcant. The log of openness has a positive eﬀect on military
burden: in particular a 10% increase in trade corresponds with a 1.2% increase in military
expenditure. This to be expected when examining a sample comprised of autocracies,
i.e. a category dominated by developing countries, and conﬁrms Rosh's hypothesis that
trade may be a source of discontent for these countries. However, this result is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Log GDP per capita has a negative yet insigniﬁcant eﬀect, while
log population has a positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on military expenditure: a
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10% increase in a country's population corresponds with an 8.5% increase in military
expenditure. The existing literature is inconclusive on the eﬀect of population on military
expenditure. This result is in keeping with the argument that larger countries require
larger defence forces, perhaps because large countries tend to be major regional or global
military powers (Hewitt, 1992). However, it runs contrary to the public goods argument
put forward by Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003), for example.
As noted above, in addition to exploring diﬀerences in military expenditure amongst
diﬀerent types of autocracies, we examine whether there are structural diﬀerences in the
standard determinants of military expenditure across the autocracies and democracies.
The results are summarized in columns 2-4 in Table 5. Column 2 shows the results of
the model estimated on the subsample of democracies (excluding regime type). Column
3 outlines the Chow test which checks for structural diﬀerences in the explanatory vari-
ables across the autocracies and democracies. In particular, the standard variables can
be interpreted as the eﬀect of each variable in autocracies, and the variables labeled "dif"
indicate the diﬀerence in eﬀect between autocracies and democracies. Log openness dif
and source dif are signiﬁcant, suggesting that these variables behave diﬀerently in autoc-
racies and democracies. Log openness might be expected to behave diﬀerently in the two
subsamples because the democracies will be dominated by developed countries, whereas
the autocracies will be comprised mostly of developing countries. Source might be ex-
pected to vary because of diﬀerences in quality of data - data on democracies being more
reliable. The fourth column summaries the results for the pooled regression, in which
log open and source are allowed to vary between autocracies (log openness, source) and
democracies (log openness 2, source 2).
The results from our ﬁrst regression do not hold up in this expanded model. This is
to be expected, as it looks at a much larger sample that includes democracies, as well as
autocracies, and the eﬀect of each regime is weakened. Interestingly, monarchies spend
the most on the military, and this result is signiﬁcant. Personalist dictators still spend
the least. However, the coeﬃcient on military regimes has dropped substantially, and
is now lower than that on single-party states though both coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant.
We can use the results in this equation to gauge the eﬀect on military spending of a
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transition from one regime type to another by plugging in values for individual countries.
For example, if Thailand were to follow the example of Nepal and reinstall its monarchy
(all hypothetically, of course), our model predicts an 8.58% increase in military spending.
If the Turkish military were to launch a coup and establish a military regime, our model
predicts military spending to increase by 4.75%. These ﬁgures are substantial.
6 Conclusions
Our paper explores whether there are systematic diﬀerences in military expenditures
across diﬀerent types of autocracies. It countributes not only to a deeper understand-
ing of what determines military expenditures, in particular the role of regime type, but
also contributes to our understanding of autocracies. Autocracies vary substantially in
terms of who rules and how they rule, a fact that is often ignored by the literature that
frequently treats autocracies as a single category. We unpack this category, arguing that
the nature of the elite, be it a royal family, a political party or a military establishment,
aﬀects elite-dictator relationships, and in particular the role of the military in keeping
these elite in check. We generate a number of hypotheses to explain why there may
be systematic diﬀerences in military expenditures between military regime, monarchies,
one-party states and personalist dictatorships. We derive a logic of authoritarianism that
generates a typology of sorts - four diﬀerent institutional arrangements - each with its
own implications for the role and inﬂuence of the armed forces.
The empirical results conﬁrm a degree of variance in the behavior of authoritarian
regimes in allocating money to the armed forces. We ﬁnd that whether dictatorships are
governed by a military organization, a monarch, a single-party or a personalistic ruler has
important implications for the allocation of the government budget to military expendi-
ture. In particulr, we ﬁnd that the four regime types can be grouped into those with
higher predicted military spending, i.e. military regimes and monarchies, and relatively
lower miltiary spending, i.e. one party states and personalist regimes. This is in keeping
with our theory, which suggests that one-party states and personalist dictators have al-
ternative ways of checking the military and need not buy the support of the military to
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the extent that military regimes and monarchies do.
There is still much to learn in order to understand the how autocracies function inter-
nally. While our paper focuses on how dictators' allocation of resources to the military, it
may be interesting to contrast this with social spending. In particular, it has been argued
that repression is a less eﬃcient tool for staying in power. History yields a number of
cases of dictators legitimizing their rule not necessarily by force but by providing public
goods, for example Brunei, Turkmenistan and several countries in the Middle East. The
ability to do this may often depends on the availability of funds, typically natural resource
revenues. Hence, the eﬀect of autocracy on military expenditures may be less clear cut
than hypothesized. Yet, a study of military spending in diﬀerent forms of autocracy yield
some interesting insights. The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that studies
of the impact of regime type on military spending must work from a more sophisticated
conception of authoritarianism.
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Table 1: Autocratic Infrastructure and Military Inﬂuence
Autocracy Leader Elite Military In-
ﬂuence
Examples
Personalist A single in-
dividual has
monopolized
control over
policy and
recruitment
Narrow group of
regime insiders.
Not bounded by
a unifying insti-
tution
Very Low. Dic-
tator has full
control of the
elite without the
constraints of
military guide-
lines. Military
is weak and de-
pendent on the
dictator. Some-
times presence
of paramilitary
forces (e.g.
Lybia, Haiti)
Mobutu Sese Seko
in Zaire/Congo
1965-97; Ferdi-
nand Marcos in
the Philippines
1972-86; Augusto
Pinochet in Chile
1973-89; Jean
Claude Duvalier
in Haiti 1976-86;
Saddam Hussein in
Iraq 1979-2003
Single Party Elected by the
party and heav-
ily dependent on
it.
High-level party
oﬃcials
Low. Com-
pletely subor-
dinated to the
party
Soviet Union 1917-
91; Nicaragua 1979-
90; China 1949-
present
Monarchy King or Emir Royal Family High. Armed
services are
given high
proportions of
national bud-
gets to ensure
the military's
loyalty
Ethiopia 1930-74;
Iran 1953-79; Jor-
dan 1946-present;
Saudi Arabia
1932-present
Military A member of
the institution-
alized military
High-level mem-
bers of the mili-
tary
Very High.
Armed forces
and security
apparatus
controlled by
members of the
elite coalition
Yemen 1962-78;
Thailand 1976-88;
Nigeria 1983-1993;
General Micombero
in Burundi 1965
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Table 2: Distribution of Regime Types
Variable N % of total N Mean milex Mean Polity
(Std Dev) (Std Dev)
Single party 894 35.39 10.01 -4.02
(19.01) (4.94)
Miltiary 274 10.85 3.86 -4.35
(2.33) (4.16)
Personalist 545 21.58 4.65 -5.16
(4.29) (3.65)
Monarchy 257 10.17 12.36 -8.19
(12.7) (2.97)
Triple threat 145 5.74 14.76 -7.1
(17.20) (2.4)
Military/personalist 136 5.38 5.98 -5.51
(5.58) (3.6)
Single party/personalist 103 4.08 4.85 -6.72
(2.87) (3.02)
Single party/military 172 6.81 4.04 -6.28
(2.76) (3.27)
Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
ratio1988 1.322 1.187 89
ratio1989 1.188 0.648 95
ratio1990 1.287 0.895 98
ratio1991 1.18 0.598 99
ratio1992 1.148 0.643 93
Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
military burden 5.685 10.235 3366
GDPpc 6173.256 11815.558 3422
pop 3.29e+07 1.15e+08 3711
open 60.122 44.654 3608
intra war 0.074 0.262 3709
inter war 0.022 0.146 3709
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Table 5: Panel estimation of the demand for military spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
single-party state 0.140 0.219 0.230
(0.50) (1.05) (1.07)
military regime 0.691∗∗ 0.233 0.136
(3.09) (1.87) (0.96)
monarchy 0.669∗ 0.403 0.456∗
(2.11) (1.80) (2.36)
Polity IV -0.0296∗ -0.0259 -0.0408∗ -0.0185
(-2.07) (-0.98) (-2.60) (-1.30)
Intra-state war 0.477∗∗∗ 0.228∗ 0.467∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(4.49) (2.44) (3.29) (4.14)
Inter-state war 0.165 0.154 0.153 0.166
(0.59) (1.87) (0.50) (1.13)
log GDP per capita -0.484 0.337∗ -0.140 -0.0840
(-0.98) (2.28) (-0.48) (-0.31)
log population 0.851∗∗∗ -0.0481 0.437∗∗ 0.398∗
(4.35) (-0.24) (2.69) (2.62)
log openness 0.127 -0.0958 0.232∗ 0.166
(1.11) (-0.63) (2.10) (1.49)
source -0.694∗∗∗ 0.0429 -0.535∗∗∗ -0.0566
(-5.20) (0.56) (-4.20) (-0.52)
PolityIV dif 0.0178
(0.60)
intra-state war dif -0.163
(-0.96)
inter-state war dif -0.0140
(-0.05)
log GDP per capita dif 0.119
(1.63)
log population dif 0.00237
(0.06)
log openness dif -0.187
(-1.90)
source dif 0.481∗∗
(2.68)
log openenss 2 0.184
(1.70)
source 2 -0.548∗∗∗
(-4.32)
N 1381 1889 3270 3270
